May
19
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Tuesday, 19 May 2009 |
In today's New York Post , at the end of an interview with General David Petraeus, he is asked what books he is reading.
"The Pathans," by Olaf Caroe, the classic work on the Pashtu of Afghanistan and Pakistan, for its wonderfully rich history;" Petraeus said.
Nice to know Petraeus and I read the same books. I read 'The Pathans' several months ago. It is an old book, thus uncolored by current politics and events.
Other books I consider essential reading include:
'Afghanistan' by Louis Dupree
'Eighteen Years in the Khyber' by Sir Richard Warburton
'Soldiers of God' by Robert Kaplan
'A History of the Kingdom of Cabul' by Mountstuart Elphinstone
The most recent of the book is 'Soldiers of God' written toward the end of the Soviet war in Afghanistan.
The oldest 'A History of the Kingdom of Cabul' is from 1815.
For another interesting view of Afghanistan I would suggest 'The Great Game' by Peter Hopkirk. It is a wonderful narrative of the various adventures and intrigues by the British and Russians during the 18th and 19th centuries.
Reading the old, obscure books helps build a foundation to understand current events. Reading the history of the Arab/Muslims people by al Tabari helped me understand Iraq in greater depth.
Reading the classics of warfare by Caesar and Xenophon shows that despite changes in technology, warfare remains essentially the same because it is still conducted by humans.
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May
12
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Tuesday, 12 May 2009 |
I looked at the young guys as they prepared for another mission and started to choke up in tears and anger.
An hour earlier I had interviewed their commanding general. After the camera and mic were off and I was packing my gear, I asked him why he became an officer.
His answer shocked me. "To avoid the draft."
I looked at the guys I was about to on a mission with. The younger onese enlisted after the initial invasion of Iraq. Many more after 9/11. They were all volunteers.
I had to get out of sight for a moment while regained my composure.
Their Commanding General lacked their character and, in my opion, was unfit to lead them.
For many senior general officers, their first time leading in any type of combat is in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Many were platoon and company officers in the 1970s and came up through the ranks in garrison commands where the criteria and metrics for promotion have zero relationship to what it takes to win a complex modern counter insurgency.
What is amazing is that there even are general officers of the caliber required during this time of war, who can adapt and understand the micro-tactics and macro-scale.
But for every larger than life warrior general, there are two or three who will never ever leave the wire to conduct the intensive battlefield circulation required to get real unvarnished information from the Captains who are out on the streets and down in the villages.
Counter insurgencies are won by Captains and Lt. Colonels, but lost by Generals.
And sometimes it difficult to find the right General.
In Iraq, from my personal observation, the best commanders were the ones on their second tour--Division Commanders who previously commanded a Brigade or Regiment. Brigade or Regimental Commanders who previously commanded a Battalion.
The proficiency and experience at the NCO level is unparalelled, same with Company level officers. Field grade is still a mixed bag, but the weak link is with the General Officers.
The only way to find the General Officers needed to win in an enviroment like Afghanistan may be to keep firing and replacing them until the right ones are found.
My choking up after my interview with the draft avoiding General was not the first, nor the last time I got choked up and angry.
Outside the wire, I am emotionless.
But everytime I see a hero flight, or wounded young men being evaced from a remote emergency hospital to one the major hospitals in Baghdad or Balaad, tears well up.
The Soldiers and Marines will go out and fight as hard and as long as required. They deserve a General who knows how to win.
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Apr
30
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Friday, 01 May 2009 |
After reading this report from Threats Watch , my crazy idea of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the US unilaterally declaring the Tribal Frontier territories of Pakistan their own country is making more sense.
Several months ago I blogged about it here .
The Frontier territories were supposed to be able to have a referendum decades ago on whether to become their own country or join Afghanistan or Pakistan.
That never happened. And now decades later, they have become their own country and are waging a war against Pakistan proper.
If Pakistan is as close to meltdown as some fear, Pashtunistan may be the only way out.
Afghanistan, Pakistan and other countries in the region declare that they recognize the sovereignty of Pashtunistan, then promptly declare war on it with help from the U.S. and anyone else willing to help resolve the issue.
It is far from an ideal solution, but in a mix of bad options and possible outcomes--the worst being a Nuclear Talibistan--it is something to consider or something that could very likely be forced upon us.
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Apr
17
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Friday, 17 April 2009 |
In 2007 Baghdad, Iraq was the undisputed murder capital of the world.
In the West Rashid district of Baghdad, the mayhem had spiraled so far out of control, the few residents that remained nick-named the district 'The Arena.'
While embedded with U.S. Infantry units in West Rashid in 2007, those murders, referred to by the military as Extra Judicial Killings, were a part of my daily life.
What we know now is that a few of those murders were committed by U.S. Forces.
This week a U.S. Soldier from a unit I embedded with was convicted of murder. Others from the unit have already been Court Martialed and convicted.
The unit was Alpha Company 1-18.
They are the subject of my new documentary, "Baghdad Happens".
I was not embedded with them when the murders were committed and to my knowledge, none of the Soldiers who overcame the twists of fortune to turn a mission from failure to success and are featured in "Baghdad Happens" are involved in the criminal proceedings.
It is always an honor and privilege for me to film and live with soldiers and I have the deepest respect for the young men who volunteered to take on the responsibility of warfare.
The events unfolding in the military court rooms and what is depicted in my documentay "Baghdad Surge" and "Baghdad Happens" are a tale of two approaches to war.
In "Baghdad Surge" the movie begins with a terrorist attack on some member of the Iraqi Highway Patrol and is followed-up shortly with a murder comitted by Iraqi Police.
In "Baghdad Happens" the Soldiers of Alpha prevent a murder.
In "Baghdad Surge" Captain Brian Ducote is determined to bring justice to the Iraqi police who murdered a man his unit's area of responsibility. The departed was definately not a good guy, but Ducote would not tolerate murder.
Less than a kilometer away from Ducote, other soldiers had been dispensing street justice Baghdad style.
The U.S. Army is showing clearly that it will not tolerate murder.
The most difficult part of counter insurgency is the moral component and the restraint needed to maintain that morality.
While it is impossible to win hearts and minds, it is possible to be consistent in following the rules of land warfare and that consistency makes the coalition a better alternative than the arbitrary and capricious militias.
Maintaining a moral code in combat is more difficult than actual combat operations. It requires a degree of self control civillians never have to face.
In 2007, I could feel the dread in Baghdad. Death permeated the city. It was almost like a pall had fallen on the city bringing out the worst in humans.
The Soldiers of the Surge lived with that death every day for their entire tour. Alpha had the absolute worst of it.
After a month in Baghdad, I went back to Al Anbar province. It felt like a weight had been lifted from my shoulders.
A few of the soldiers of Alpha succumbed to that weight, they were crushed by the darkness and became a part of it.
While I cannot condone their behaviour, I do understand how it happens.
"Baghdad Happens" shows some of the soldiers of Alpha Company. It is a different kind of documentary. It is upbeat. It captures the thrill of a successful mission and the complexity of even a simple mission.
It captures a group of young men on one day. It is a snap shot of the war. And that snap shot shows a group of brave men.
"Baghdad Happens" is the unintentional counter-balance to what is unfolding in the courts martial in Germany.
As the story of the courts martial grows, which it will, I hope my movie shows that there is more to the story of Alpha Company.
Yes, the darkness captured the souls of a few men, but far more of the men of Alpha were the ones who beat back the night and brought light and life back to West Rashid and Baghdad.
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Apr
13
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Monday, 13 April 2009 |
A few days ago, after a brief exchange with Ed from hotair.com , I quickly typed up a rational choice model of how the standoff could end.
Based on the game settlements, I postulated the most likely outcome would be O4/T3.
The O4 standing for Obama Option #4 was "Pirates taken by force, Captain saved."
The T3 standing for Pirates, terrorist Option #3 was "Pirates taken by force, Captain killed, US personnel killed."
Ed, after seeing the scenarios, agreed that my O4/T3 was probably where it would end up.
I ran a another scenario in which the pirates were "run-of-the-mill" but as the facts played out, the pirates were more committed to the cause than that game scenario revealed.
The two levels of pirates addressed the big known unkown-- how recalcitrant the pirates would be.
Now, how did a blogger run a half-assed version of rational choice game theory and get it right?
Well, I can tell you I did very little research. I scanned Google headlines, skimmed the wikipedia and drew more than anything else on my experience watching these scenarios game out in Iraq.
I also run more complex rational choice game models in the political campaigns I consult on.
The key with all of these is motive. Understanding what the sides want. I don't get bogged down into "why", because that is best thought of as another thing they want.
As it turned out, President Obama as National Command Authority gave the military broad authority within the general orders. The Commander on scene made the call in split second decision, and could because the assets were in place.
When the President gave the authorization, he jumped to an O4 option. As I previously stated, O4 was fraught with danger, but the best option because it has the highest payoff. And if the pirates were terrorists, well, then there really was no other acceptable option in the scenario.
According to the initial reports I read--and I have only skimmed a few--the Pirates chose to jump into their own T3.
This was not difficult, it did not require any particular insight, just a little logic.
When you take motive into account, you can eliminate a couple of options T6, T7, T8 and O7, O8.
If you add options, lowest number being best, then divide by the number of options you get 3.27 as a mathematical settlement average.
That is the absolute most crude, poorly calculated way to play rational choice. But the models generally work like that.
Options are listed, weighted, then a settlement arrived at.
The important part is to understand that each player is acting in a way that is rational to them, which is why you need to understand motive.
Understand motive, and you can predict a lot of behaviour, even if it is irrational, people can be predictable in their irrationality.
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Apr
09
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Friday, 10 April 2009 |
Something strange is happening in the situation of the captain being held hostage by Somali pirates.
U.S. Citizens are taken hostage by brigands rather often and rarely, very rarely is the FBI employed in these situations. As person who travels through a lot of foreign countries I know the U.S. position rather well--if you are taken hostage or kidnapped and held for ransom, you are pretty much on your own.
So, this situation has interesting components.
Lets start with what we know about the pirates:
Started operating more frequently in 1990s
They are in it mostly for the money
Usually do not harm crew
Hold cargo for ransom
Made about $150m last year
Some Pirates linked to terror groups
This particular group is thought to be linked to AQI
The other party to this situation is President Obama.
In rational choice theory, the game, when played properly, zeroes in on motive.
President Obama, like all politicians has the foremost objective of 'looking good'. His motivation is to avoid a situation that he looks bad, incompetent, weak etc. His goal is avoid an outcome where the fact pattern makes him look bad.
So, now we look at the various options, ranked in preference among the players in a very crude rational choice game.
Obama
O1 Pirates surrender
O2 Pirates release Captain, then taken by force
O3 Pirates release Captain, then escape
O4 Pirates taken by force, Captain saved
O5 Pirates taken by force, Captain killed
O6 Pirates taken by force, Captain killed, US personnel killed
O7 Pirates escape with Captain
O8 Pay off Pirates, Pirates double cross, kill captain, becomes publicly known
Pirates, non-terrorist
P1 Collect ransom, release captain, continue business
P2 Release Captain, continue business
P3 Surrender, handed over to regional authorities, continue business
P4 Surrender, wind up in prison
P5 Taken by force, Captain lives, wind up in prison
P6 Taken by force, Pirates killed
Pirates, terrorist
T1 Pay off Pirates, Pirates double cross, kill Captain, youtube video
T2 Escape with Captain
T3 Pirates taken by force, Captain killed, US personnel killed
T4 Pirates taken by force, Captain killed
T5 Pirates taken by force, Captain saved
T6 Pirates release Captain, then taken by force
T7 Pirates release Captain, allowed to escape
T8 Pirates surrender
If we are dealing with run-of-the-mill pirates, then the outcome will be P3, the pirates surrender then are handed over to regional authorities who slap their wrists and let them continue business.
In this scenario everybody pretty much gets what they want.
But, if we are dealing with terrorist pirates, look at how the options line up on the continuum. The best case for Obama is the worst for the terrorist pirates and vice versa.
Anything from O5 through O8 is politically unaccepable to Obama and O4 has a probablity of turning into O5. But O4 has a high payoff.
Anything beyond T4 is politically unacceptable to the terrorists. This assumes that the pirate terrorists are full on nut jobs ready for martyrdom. If they are not committed to the Jihad, then it will be a P3 with a P5 veneer, or O5. They will let themselves be taken.
If these are terrorist pirates, then this is a test. To see what Obama does. At which point the result is transmitted to the world and Obama's measure is taken. Terrorists play more for Gross Rating Points and headlines than they do for tactical advantage.
An ocean standoff dragging on would be good for GRPs, especially if the terrorist pirates let it be known they are terrorists. This is bad for Obama politically, but allowing them to stall is tactically smart. The terrorists will tire out, run out of potable water and food.
The tactical downside risk is that they just go ahead and kill the Captain then martyr themselves in whatever fashion is most dramatic--which gets them what they wanted anyway, headlines.
So, the settlement is O4/T3. Obama rolls the dice, lets the SEALS do their thing and if all goes well, the result will be O4. O4 also has the most positive GRPs for the United States--not just Obama.
But this drama on the high seas is only Act I. What really counts is the follow-on actions that will resolve the piracy problem or allow business as usual.
This game I have mapped out is 'on-the-fly' I have not calculated weights on what is known, the known uknowns and the most important factor the uknown unknowns. The unknown unknowns--the things you don't know and don't even realize you don't know--are what usually what destroy a plan or a model. I have not even really thought out the motives, which is the key, and the scenarios the motives would operate on.
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Apr
01
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Wednesday, 01 April 2009 |
This report caught my attention over the weekend.
A less hyped report is here .
Most likely it is nothing. The coalition and ISF are always arresting bad guys posing as good guys. It is too easy in war to read too much into the daily events.
But, nearly two years ago I wrote about what could be the looming real civil war in Iraq and how it tied to the awakening movement.
I wrote then:
"They [Anbar Sunni Sheiks] may have also seen the need to build an Anbar based security force that can be used--if need be--to wage a real civil war against against the Shia.
"This civil war would not be teenaged death squads killing Shia or Sunni at random but the Beirut style civil war Fearon writes about. In other words, it would be a real civil war."
The non-civil war of 2006 and early 2007 that I witnessed was more of a sectarian blood debt run amok than a real civil war. All it took to stop the blood debt cycle was for U.S. Soldiers to stand between the factions and say "stop." Occasionally they took on the responsibility of carrying out the debt, hunting down and capturing or, if they resisted, killing the leading perpetrators of violence.
The Sunni are now armed and organized enough to wage a real civil war.
I doubt it will jump off.
But U.S. Soldiers will be needed for a long time to stand between the factions and to step in say "stop."
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Feb
16
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Monday, 16 February 2009 |
On March 5th of 1809, the the British diplomat Mountstuart Elphinstone met with Shah Suja in Peshawar.
Shah Suja was the King of the Pathan tribes and Elphinstone's mission was the first official diplomatic meeting between the British and the Pathans.
After reading Elphinstone's vast survey of the Pathan tribes and the Shah's kingdom, one will be amazed at how little has changed.
Swords, pikes and matchlocks have been replaced with AK-47's and RPG's. Camels and horses have been replaced with pickup trucks and rickity buses.
But very little else has changed.
The nature of how little things have changed became starkly apparant to me a few months ago when young man from Peshawar, via Qatar, bought the corner gas station near where I live.
At first I chatted him up in Arabic, after seeing some script on a jacket he was wearing. I could tell he was not an Arab. And he confirmed that he was from Pakistan.
But, he went further. He was an Afghan, a Peshawar Pathan.
At the time Elphinstone met with Shah Suja, the Afghan/Pathan kingdom ran roughly from the Indus river in the east to the the plains south and west of Kabul.
This has historically been the domain of the Pathan peoples, the real Afghanistan. On a modern map it would cover the western parts of Pakistan, the tribal areas, the rugged mountains and west across most of modern Afghanistan.
The residents of those areas, even those living in the midwest of the United States, still think of themselves as the real Afghans. Historically, an Afghan was a member of the Pathan people.
As we move toward the official 200-year mark of western involvement in the region, it would behoove the Obama administration to read Elphinstone and understand that compared to the deeply ingrained identity and traits of the Pathans, the 200 years of varying adventures by British, Russians, Soviets and now the U.S. are just another in a long series of attempts that have usually failed and at best marginally succeeded.
The Kyhber is almost a rite of passage for the great empires. The only great empire that didn't make it to the Kyber was the Roman.
And most just passed through, very few stayed for long and none, none controlled the mountains. Not even the greatest of the Afghan kings really controlled the mountains.
The acknowledged truth is that but for a handful of brigands living in the mountains who harbor visions of being the vanguard of a new, unique Koranic generation bent on global jihad, no one would care about what happens in those mountains. The tribes would go about life as they have since before the time of Alexander.
The essential element of that life is the Pashtoonwali, the code of the Pathans, which all but mandates an eye for an eye type of fueding and defense of guests seeking asylum.
The code preceeded Islam and has withstood every attempt at modern corruption.
Understanding the code is how a few British officers were able to temporarily tame parts of the frontier and is the best hope for success in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Yes, Pakistan. Because the terrain is human, Pathan, and not demarcated by an imaginary line.
And that is what Elphinstone understood 200 years ago that we need to understand today.
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Jan
09
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Friday, 09 January 2009 |
"How do you defeat an idea? How do you defeat a dream?" Colonel Bob Chase asked rhetorically.
It was the Summer of 2005, a period of stasis in Iraq before the wheels came off in 2006.
I was interviewing him on the side porch of the Saddam era palace in Ramadi that was now the headquarters of the 2nd Marine Division.
Over the Colonel's shoulder was the Euphrates and the city of Ramadi. Eighteen months later, the battle for the city would resemble a slow moving game of tetris, as Soldier and Marines claimed the city block by block, laying down concrete barriers to hold their territory.
In the Summer of 2005, as the Operations Officer of the Division, Chase had the power of life and death. A nod from him made people, buildings and city blocks disappear.
But those kinetic operations were only part of the answer to the question Chase needed to answer.
As I watch the events unfolding in Gaza, I remember the lessons from that Summer in Anbar province--clearing Amiriyah and Ferris twice, clearing Kharmah twice, the city of Fallujah, despite being cleared in the largest set-piece siege since Hue, was slowly being re-infested.
There will be peace in the middle east when, and only when, the Arabs finally accept that Israel will not be destroyed, the Hebrews will not be pushed into the sea and the status quo of this long running conflict is no longer worth it.
The insurgency of Iraq--Shia, Sunni, Baathist and evey hybrid thereof--operated on simple strategic concept: Just get the U.S. to leave.
The key strategic metric for the insurgents was a poll number that asked the American public if the war was "Worth it." The insurgent's only hope was the fickle nature of the American people and politicians in Washington, D.C.
That was how deep they viewed the battlefield.
The tide in Iraq first turned in Anbar when the tribal leaders and their kin accepted that the Marines were never leaving, Al Qaida and their associates could not deliver anything but criminality, the dream could not be achieved and getting on with normal life was the best course of action.
Michael Yon, in his book "Moment of Truth in Iraq" has a very profound statement on war:
"The American soldier is the most dangerous man in the world, and the Iraqis had to learn that before they would trust or respect us. But it was when they understood that these great-hearted warriors, who so enjoyed killing the enemy, are even happier helping build a school or to make a neighborhood safe that we really got their attention."
The residents of Gaza, who elected Hamas, may need to learn the very hard way that Israel, with very little effort, could push them into the sea, but would rather sell them electronics and fizzy drinks.
And that is the deeper battlefield Israel needs to fight on.
General Raymond Odierno, the Commander of Multi National Forces in Iraq constantly uses the phrase "passive support." That passive support can be for the insurgents or the coalition and the Iraq government.
It is the passive support that has propped up Hamas. Elimination of the passive support is the only path to a lasting victory.
In Iraq, the coalition eventually had the advantage of fragile Iraqi government for the passive support to shift to.
Fatah is not much an alternative, but there isn't much else to choose from
The seemingly interminable conflict will not be resolved through negotiations. Negotiating with an Arab is a sign of weakness and only emoboldens them.
It will end the way all wars end, decision by the losing combatant that his goals, his idea, his dream, is lost, cannot be achieved and it is no longer worth it to fight. Some people come to this conclusion quicker than others.
When the residents of Gaza see that Israel will not stop and that no can or will stop them, and that Hamas has been selling them a fantasy, then the passive support can shift. If, at that moment, Israel can turn on a dime and offer the alternative, maybe peace can finally be had.
A dream, an idea, is defeated by showing that it cannot be achieved or the effort to achieve it is just not worth it.
In the Middle East, this is compounded because the dream is intertwined with religion and personal identity. Renunciation of the dream is on a level with renouncing the faith--and we know how apostates are treated in Islam.
But, I have seen enough Al Qaida and Jaish al Mahdi affiliates flip sides to know that it is possible for all but the most fervent to accept a different interpretation of allah's will.
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Dec
18
2008
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Written by JD Johannes
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Thursday, 18 December 2008 |
The just released Army Field manual on "Training for Full Spectrum Operations" has a recurring theme of innovation, agility and adaptation.
This theme is summed up in paragraph 2-69 of the manual, Educate Leaders to Think. (Page 28 of the PDF file.)
The best way to "Educate Leaders to Think" may be outside of the military and far outside of what is normally considered training.
In my travels through Iraq I have watched hundreds of Non-Commissioned Officers operate outside the wire. I have followed dozens of platoon leaders and company commanders through the daily grind of warfare. I spent significan time with four batallion commanders in diverse environments.
I have intentionally focused on the company and battalion level and below. In any level of conflict below force-on-force general warfare, the weight rests on the company commander.
General Raymond Odierno, Commander of Multi-National Forces Iraq, made that point in an interview I recently taped. Odierno described how company commanders have been given a set of tools to use in reconciling former insurgents. Odierno called them, "confidence building measures."
During my years in Iraq, I have seen company commanders go from engaging in full scale Hammer & Anvil operations to something akin to Victorian era territorial administrators and defacto mayors.
And I have seen them toggle back and forth, sometimes several times a day.
Sometimes the units were well prepared for the mission sometimes not.
Marine 1st Lieutenant Sean Gobin who commanded Vengeance Platoon, a company sized Heavy Combined Arms Team, in Fallujah summed it up best:
"We trained for the battle of Stalingrad, but wound up being the Sheriff of Fallujah."
Vengeance was not well prepared for the full spectrum mission when they arrived, but were still successful.
What allowed Vengeance to successful was two things: First, they were tactically proficient and highly lethal, they had mastered the basics. Second, was the adaptability of Gobin and his two Platoon Sergeants.
Vengeance platoon was hybrid. One half active duty, on half reserve.
Lt. Gobin was all about the mission and not afraid to take risks. His First Sgt., Gunnery Sgt. Rodriguez was straight out of central casting. His two Platoon Sergeants, Gunnery Sgt. Brad Pollock and Staff Sgt. Tony Rider were reserve Marines who were on their second tour.
Moreover, Pollock and Rider were successful entreprenuers. Rider owned franchise restaurants and Pollock was an engineer who ran a waste management company. They were used to uncertainty, taking risks, solving problems, dealing with complexity and scale.
Gobin also had a leg-up on most 1st Lieutenants. He was prior enlisted. He had more experience than his peers and quality experience as an RTO. He was next to a company commander for two years before he went to college and Office Candidate School.
In the modern Full Spectrum war, the training should also encompass a full sprectrum of experience or as many varied experiences as possible. The full variation needed can not be had in each individual, that would be improbable if not outright impossible, but a within a battalion it could be possible.
The military of Victorian era Britian could be a loose model on how to obtain this range of experience.
In my prepration for my Afghanistan expedition--it will probably be my last I have been reading voratiously. Much of the reading is from books written by British officers and administrators like Caroe, Elphinstone and Warburton. It is mixed with a healthy dose of histories of the Great Game.
In this era it was not uncommon for officers to take extensive leave where they would become correspondents for the leading newspapers of the day, travel through foreign countries and take part in expeditions sponsored by the Royal Geographic Society.
These leaves allowed officers to gain experience outside the staid and formal regimental system of the British military of the time.
In the U.S. military, officers will often leave the formal military to pursue a graduate degree or take a fellowship or assignment in another governmental agency.
To prepare officers and staff ncos for the ongoing full spectrum enviroment, I propose this be expanded and almost universalized.
It is not uncommon for officers and staff ncos to pursue an MBA. A degree with more application to warfare than one would imagine at first blush. But why not let them take a year or two to test the skills earned in the classroom in the business world? Let an officer try his hand at starting a business or working for a medium sized company. That officer would be in a great position to help build an economic activity in a city in Iraq. The lessons in decision making, leadership and analysis would transfer well to the military.
Instead of having Foreign Area Officers based out of an embassy, give Lieutenants a plane ticket and some cash and ship them off to any country outside of North America and Western Europe and force them to live by their wits for year. They will return as subject matter experts in a culture and speaking the language almost fluently.
The idea would also apply to the non-combat arms specialties. Logistics and supply could work in transportation, import/export and distribution companies. JAG officers could work in District Attorneys offices, or as Public Defenders or any firm that would have them. Public Affairs officers and NCOs would gain valuable experience as general assignment reporters for local TV stations and small daily papers.
It would not be a fellowship or glorified internship. It would have to be a sink or swim experience. Since the military loves to quantify and measure things to standards, the rating of the performance of the sojourn tour would establish the degree of difficulty of the sojourn and compare the success or failure to the degree of difficulty. Working for an established company is not very difficult. Starting a business from scratch is very difficult.
The sojourn tour would not be a one-time tour. In the infantry track it would fit nicely between platoon and company command then another while on brigade or battalion staff.
Full Spectrum warfare requires officers and NCOs with a full spectrum of experience--real life experience.
The only way to get that experience is to get outside the military, government and university. Soldiers need to placed where organizations and individuals are forced by the market and circumstances to to adapt, be agile and innovate.
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