Quite possibly the greatest innovation has been the use of a practical sling .

(Seriously, the M-16 A2 not only fires a pathetic 5.56mm round, but it also long, clumsy and difficult to customize for any mission beyond a rifle range.)

The largest and most important change brought by years of sustained combat is the slow change in attitude.

In Iraq I once had a pleasant disagreement with a Field Grade Officer about 'what an Army does.'

He had remarked that they trained, had schools and developed professional leaders.  The gist being that we needed to get out of Iraq and get back to doing what Armies do.

I pointed out that fighting wars is actually what Armies do and training, schools and development were what they did to keep busy in between wars.

Evidence of this slow shift is the creation of Centers for Lessons Learned in the Army and Marine Corps.  These semi-autonomous think tanks were all created post 9/11.

In the past analysis of combat was largely done after the fact and by military historians.  Today it is being done on the fly, with the centers and fighting labs drilling down to micro-tactics, techniques and procedures that work and aggregating data and experiences.

After five years of sustained operations on two fronts, officers with combat experience who survive the bureacracy will be the ones who re-shape the promotion system.  The current system, a series of check marks and ratings by superiors, clones leaders.

But war is not about check marks, it is about achieving a result.  In counter insurgency, a commander could engage in many successful operations, but still not achieve a result.  Often humans and the military mistake motion for progress.

Mistaking motion for progress is a mistake fewer and fewer commanders are making.  One Battatlion Commander kept a running tally on insurgents killed in his area operations.  He would tell me 'we have killed X number of insurgents, but that is a measurment of failure.'

A powerpoint slide showing the number of insurgents killed may look impressive, and any number of reports and power point presentations may look impressive but the statistics don't correlate with progress toward the desired result.

The U.S. Military now has more personnel with real combat and deployment experience than ever.  Multiple tour veterans have learned what does and does not work.  They lead with hard won experience.

The challenge for the policymakers is to retain those with knowledge and experience and once this long war is over to not allow the garrison mentality of shiny boots and starched cammies to infect the military ever again.

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