Aug
31
2010
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Written by JD Johannes
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Tuesday, 31 August 2010 |
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There has been much chatter leading up to the President's speech tonight about Iraq.
Many people are noting what was said by certain politicians and other noteables in 2007 regarding the Surge and comparing it to their current opinions.
My favorite quote from 2007 went something like this:
"When historians write about the Iraq war they will write about the invasion, the Battle of Fallujah and OUR VICTORY in the Surge."
Those words were written on a piece of poster board in the tactical operations center of the 1-28 Infantry 'The Black Lions' in the West Rashid district of Baghdad. I saw them in May of 2007.
My second favorite is this rant by Glenn Greenwald. [Scroll down to (2) where he starts talking about me. He's responding to this post. ]
I witnessed the Surge in person. I was the first reporter to see the Anbar Awakening spread past Ramadi down the Euphrates river valley. I spent a month in Baghdad with an infantry battalion building safe neighborhoods and capturing Jaish al Mahdi leaders.
The Surge was not something I watched on TV. I saw it with my own eyes and through my own camera lens.
During those months I encoutered two suicide truck bombs, dodged machine gun fire, should have been killed by enemy mortar fire and got shot at a few more times. I honestly do not know how I lived. I caught an intestinal virus from the sewage in Baghdad and met an Iraqi man whose stand against Al Qaida was equal parts "High Noon" and "Walking Tall." I lived down in the dirt with Soldiers who volunteered to fight what had become a very unpopular war, Soldiers who were being told they had failed.
When I made it back to the US it was like I had entered an alternate universe where the facts on the ground were denied vehemently by those who had staked a position in favor of failure.
Joining the fray, I penned articles and editorials like this one showing how despite losing on the ground in Iraq, the insurgents were winning inside the Beltway and in major media.
I was back in Baghdad in 2008 and the changes were undeniable.
Those months in Iraq are something I will always carry with me and I will never forget who wanted to win and who said we had already lost.
I also know that the American people are not stupid, they will remember as well.
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Nov
24
2009
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Written by Administrator
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Tuesday, 24 November 2009 |
The blood debt is a custom in many cultures, but unknown to many Westerners.
In Iraq the tradition of the blood debt helped fuel the sectarian killing sprees that nearly plunged the country into a civil war.
In it is purest form, as described by Edward Gibbon in Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, it is truly an eye for an eye a life for a life debt.
Everyman, at least every family, was the judge and avenger of his own cause...the interest and principle of the bloody debt are accumulated; the individuals of either family lead a life of malice and suspicion, and fifty years may sometime elapse before account of the vengeance be finally settled.
But that is the most base understanding of the blood debt.
In Iraq and Afghanistan tribal leaders often negotiate the blood debt to a cash or property settlement. The family and tribe of the deceased agree to not seek blood if they are compensated.
Just yesterday I witnessed a highly formalized negotiation about the blood debt by the nascent Tribal Union in Dujayl, Iraq.
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| Dujayl Tribal Union meeting in a school auditorium |
The goal of the Tribal Union is to unify the tribes in this agrarian community so to have a unified voice before the civil government.
To do that, the any disputes need to be resolved quikcly and equitably. The leadership of the Union is proposing standardized procedures to resolve grievances.
Meeting a school auditorium and sitting on plastic chairs, more than 100 Sheiks took part in the open meeting of the Union.
The Tribal Union is a relatively new creation in Dujayl. In the early years of the war, US forces went looking for anyone and everyone who would cooperate with them.
In Dujayl a man who spoke English was the first to shake the hand of US forces. He said the right things and put on a good act. But he was not a real Sheik and had no real influence.
He did make a lot of money off the US though.
During the Surge and after, it became obvious that the Sheiks Council of Dujayl was populated by scoundrels. The US officers began to follow the tribal roots back to the real Sheiks. The fake Sheiks fled, the Council was dissolved and the Tribal Union formed.
US Army CPT Justin Daubert sits on the stage during the meetings, as a representative of the strongest and richest tribe in Dujayl, but does not take an active role in the open meetings.
CPT Daubert does his work behind the scenes with key leaders to steer them through the bureaucracy and encouraging the Sheiks to keep working on unification.
After a prolonged session of hand-shakes and kisses on the cheeks, the Sheiks took their seats and got down to business.
The first issue to be tackled--the blood debt.
A motion was put forward that if a member of one tribe kills the member of another tribe, the standard, the killer or his tribe or family should pay the victim's family 20 million dinar--about $20,000 US dollars.
Many of the Sheiks seemed to think the number was fair. There were proposals for a higher payment, up to 50 million dinar or for a sliding scale is the killer's family was poor.
The main topic of debate was who and how the case would be judged.
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A room full Sheiks
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Proposals were made on how Sheiks would be selected to ensure they would be impartial, who could represent the accused and the deceased and the mechanism to ensure that once a judgment was issued it was carried out.
All these matters were discussed in the presence of the Mayor of Dujayl, the Chief of Police and two members of the City Council. The Mayor even took part in the deliberations.
How the law of the government would interface with tribal law was barely touched on.
People are arrested, prosecuted and convicted for murder in Iraq. The blood debt is tribal version of a wrongful death suit that also prevents inter-tribal violence.
After the usual rounds of passionate sounding debate the issue was tabled and at some point in the future a committee will prepare proposals for the Union to vote on.
The next item taken up by the Union was all the bad drivers the need for traffic laws in Dujil.
All agreed that the young kids drive like maniacs and something needs to be done about it. When an Iraqi says you drive like maniac--you are truly a hazard to everything on the road.
The meeting adjourned, hands were shook, cheeks were kissed, the US Army officers were pressed by the Sheiks for more development projects.
The Tribal Union fills a gap between the rural population and the civil government providing some type of representation and voice.
In the upcoming elections, tribal groups could be the deciding factor whether there is a strong unity slate elected from Sala Ad Din or if they will continue to take their local arguments with them to Baghdad.
Once the US Army leaves, the tribes will become stronger. Tribal groups that are organized will be in position to negotiate directly with Baghdad and the provincial government.
The long term goal of the Union is to become the equivalent of a powerful lobbying group and voting block. Together, the tribes represent a lot of voters who could punish or reward politicians.
The success of the Union will be based on its cohesion and ability to deliver votes.
If the open list is used in the upcoming elections, then the single non-transferrable vote system will be in place. The groups that can turn out the most votes in the most organized fashion will be the ones to hold power in Iraq. The Union is on track to do that. But first it has to resolve all the tribal disputes and standardize the payment of blood debts.
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Oct
07
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Wednesday, 07 October 2009 |
Governing by polls and popularity regularly leads to failure and indecision due to the nature of information provided by polls which reflects how humans caliberate choices.
In the US a campaign is mostly binary. The electorate can choose between Candidate A or Candidate B. They have only two things to compare thus the caliberation is easy.
But once in office and setting forth proposals and policies, there are multiple options. There are many potential ways to go forward in Afghanistan.
The electorate looks at the current situation, the proposal and the many other possibilities. Each individual also has their individual idealized solution for their personal situation. Thus consensus is hard to reach.
In approval ratings polls, it becomes even more clear. The office holder is no longer compared to a singular or potential pair of opponents, he is compared to the preferences of respondent. The office holder is not compared to Candidate B, but to a preferred version of what that office holder could or should be.
Very rarely do office office holders match enough of the electorate's preferences to have a wide approval rating for the long haul.
Candidates and staffers who are very good at campaigns are very good at winning the binary comparision battle.
But governing is not a binary comparison.
Passing legislation and governing is easiest when the office holder does not try to win a binary against the many potential ideals, but by winning against the worst case scenario.
With the public growing weary of the protracted wars and the well known challenges of Afghanistan, the best option is not arguing in favor of the best possible outcome in Afghanistan, but how to prevent the worst possible scenario.
It is impossible to achieve a meaningful plurality on the best possible outcome in Afghanistan, but it is possible to reach a majority on how to prevent the worst case scenario.
The worst case being the Taliban controlling all of Afghanistan and as in 1990s, allowing it to be safe haven for various international terrorist groups and groups seeking to topple the Pakistani Government.
We all can agree on what that led to in the past.
Then the work of building a large plurality becomes easier.
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Jun
03
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Wednesday, 03 June 2009 |
As noted in the WSJ editorial , the confirmation hearings for Lt. Gen. McChrystal were pretty much a non-event.
There were plenty of agitators wanting to pick a fight, but President Obama possess a set of unique abilities as Commander in Chief--namely that he is a left leaning, mostly anti-war Democrat.
But because he has taken ownership of the fight in Afghanistan many of the agitators are blunted.
Which is an ability I hope he continues to use.
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Jun
01
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Monday, 01 June 2009 |
Yard signs, posters and banners were every where in Kuwait in May 2005.
I was in transit limbo and had a few days to catch glimpses of the campaigns.
It is amazing how political signs look the same everywhere--how there is almost a regression to the mean in all political campaigns no matter what country they are in.
I was reminded of Kuwait's elections by this column in the WSJ .
After Islamist parties won elections, many thought it proved democracy promotion was a bad idea. Why promote democracy if the wrong parties get elected?
But the same waxing and waning of parties and ideologies we see in Western countries applies to Arab countries as well.
What is important is not who wins a particual election but that the machinery of elections and democracy itself which holds those who won accountable.
In selectorate theory of elections, a large voting pool and frequent elections forces a moderation as the ruling elite must maintain a large and diverse coalition.
Promotion of legitimate elections as a policy cannot be judged by one or two election cycles, but must be viewed over the long term.
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Apr
20
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Monday, 20 April 2009 |
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Two years ago Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid declared the Surge a failure and the war in Iraq lost.
I was in Iraq when Reid made the statement. Here is what I wrote then .
Here are two more follow-ups.
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Apr
08
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Wednesday, 08 April 2009 |
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In response to the demands and actions of Muslim Barbary Pirates, President Thomas Jefferson sent the Marines . (Marines and some professional military contractors.)
Thus the verse in the Marine Corps Hymn , "To the shores of Tripoli."
Muslim pirates, this time centered around Somalia, are once again making demands and threatening U.S. interests.
Will Obama respond like Jefferson?
Previous blogs mentioning the Barbary Pirates as the first U.S. war with Islamic enemies here and here .
UPDATE: Crew of the hi-jacked vessel has overpowered the Pirates. So, we'll have to wait and see if the Pirates present another opportunity for Obama to act, or, if he will use this instance as justification for going after the Pirates O'Bannon style.
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Mar
28
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Saturday, 28 March 2009 |
Here's the white paper on President Obama's AfPak Plan.
Nothing in it to really disagree with. But, more telling, there is nothing to indicate that it will become successful.
In 2007 I was confident the Surge would succeed because it was attached to a complete change in strategy, codified in Army/Marine Field Manual FM 3-24.
In it one saw tried and true counter insurgency techniques employed by French in Algeria, British in Malaya and even Napoleanic troops in the Rhineland.
Many of those techniques will apply to Afghanistan.
The six-page paper produced by the administration does not inspire the confidence that one could see in the surge's application of solid counter insurgency principles.
Knowing that Petraeus is now commanding Cent Com and is personally overseeing the development of Afghan strategy and tactics gives me more hope than the administration's white paper.
But Afghanistan is not Iraq.
There is a great body of writing on Afghanistan from the British Victorian era. The British faced the same challenges we face. Indeed, the only thing that has changed in Afghanistan is the technology of the weaponry.
In my pre-deployment reading there is a recurring theme to these works, one summed up best by Robert Warburton:
"...to deal with Afghans, officers must be employed who have knowledge of their languages, customs and ways."
That quote comes from Warburton's memoir "Eighteen Years in the Khyber."
Let the title of the book sink in for a moment. Eighteen Years stationed in and around the Khyber pass. There were British officers stationed there before him and after him.
Warburton was the son of a British Officer and Afghan mother.
The administration's paper concludes:
"There are no quick fixes to achieve U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The danger of failure is real and the implications are grave."
Very few in America had the patience to see the surge through--even though it only took 18 months to achieve the objective.
Does the administration have the patience to create a modern generation of Warburtons who may spend 18 years in the Khyber?
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Dec
01
2008
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Written by JD Johannes
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Monday, 01 December 2008 |
In the aftermath of the attacks on Mumbai, some people are waking up to the presence of radical Islam in India.
The intellectual foundations of modern Takfiri Islam can be traced to India through the Deobandi School of study to Hassan al Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood to Sayyid Qtub and the current machinations of Ayman Zawahiri. But the story goes back further than that.
In 1539 an Afghan Khan originally named Farid seized control of the Mughal Empire taking the name Sher Shah.
Afghan rule was nothing new to parts of the subcontinent. Pathan (Afghan) Sultans of one type or another had feifdoms in India since the 13th century. Sher Shah's sweep to power over the remnants of Babur's Mughal Empire in many ways was a restoration of power for the Afghans in India according to the British Diplomat Sir Olaf Caroe.
Afghan Muslims nominally ruled India until a revolt was staged against the British in 1857. The British crushed the revolt and what little left of the Muhgals placing the British Raj in power.
The Deoband school of Islam was founded in 1866 by Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi as the Darl Uloom Seminary. The purpose was to restore Islam to its roots, to what many modern Takfiris including Qtub and Zawahiri call the ways of the "unique Quranic generation." Those would be the ways of Mohammed and his original followers--the prophet and his companions.
The crushing of the Muslims in India was another milestone of the West crushing Dar al Islam, which at one time spread from Spain to Indonesia.
Only with a return to the ways of the prophet and his companions, so the theory goes, would Islam once again rise to power and its rightful position in the world.
(The Pathans in Afghanistan always followed a more conservative version of Islam--at least in form. The British Diplomat Montstuart Elphinstone wrote of women wearing Burquas in 1815, more than 50 years before the Deobandi movement.)
The events of last week were not of the making of the last few years or for that matter the 20th century.
Much of the history of India is that of the Raj versus the Khan or the Shah. The Queen, though having a massive sway for three and half centuries, is but a blip in the sweep of history.
History churns on and to understand a news even today, we must often look deep into the past. If the past is understood well enough, the potential future can be understood as well.
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Nov
02
2008
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Written by JD Johannes
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Sunday, 02 November 2008 |
(Note: In the occasional blog posts I get the time to read in Iraq, I've kept up with Dr. Helen's "Going John Galt" series.
Depending on the turns of history, there could be another type of Galt, not from the business class, but the Guardian class. Allow me to illustrate with this fictional news item. JD)
Lieutenant Colonel John Galt, who commanded an Army Infantry Battalion during the Baghdad Surge, resigned his commission today after declining promotion to full Colonel and the command of an infantry brigade.
Galt's former Battalion, 'The Falcons' was credited with taming some of the most violent districts of Baghdad and the techniques he used have been applied by other units with great success. The success of 'The Falcons' was cited by the commander of coalition forces in Iraq, the Secretary of Defense and even the former President.
"He was on track for a Division command, Corps Command even being a combatant commander," said Lt. Col. Phil Jackson (Ret.) "but he was not willing to take a Brigade to Iraq just to be a rear guard on the withdrawal. Galt wins. He finishes the mission. He does not intentionally lose."
Jackson also recently resigned his commission after a tour as a Battalion Commander.
Galt graduated from Vanderbilt University with a degree in History and Economics before being commissioned and earned a Masters Degree in International Relations from Johns Hopkins. He previously served tours in the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan.
Galt is one of many commanders and field grade officers taking retirement rather than promotion. The trend is also appearing in the Staff NCO Corps as veteran Platoon Sergeants, 1st Sergeants and Sergeants Major are failing to reenlist.
"It is the largets brain and experience drain ever to occur to the U.S. Military," said Thomas Brow, a Sr. Fellow at the Strategic Research Institute, a think tank that tracks trends in national security.
Brow said the loss of experienced and dynamic military leaders will be noted by rivals to the U.S. "They see men like Galt leaving and know that the 'Junior Varsity' will be leading troops for the next generation. The implications for international strategy and negotiations are immense."
Galt left his last post without ceremony, packing up his family and moving to his retirement home in Knoxville, TN where he works part-time as a clerk at small book store.
When asked in person why he left the military after a disguinished career with a bright future he did not comment and only shrugged.
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