Jun
22
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Monday, 22 June 2009 |
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Over the years I have written that the strategy and tactics of Al Qaida and the Taliban were geared toward affecting media coverage of the wars.
The best chance of the US and Coalition withdrawing from Iraq or Afghanistan was not through military force employed by the Taliban or Al Qaida, but through an erosion of political will on the part of the American public and members of Congress. The will of the public is affected by what it sees in the media, therefore, the media has always been the target of action.
This is 4th Generation Warfare.
A line in a report about the kidnapping and detention of New York Times reporter David Rhode caught my eye and is excerpted by Powerline .
The key line in the excerpt:
"The kidnappers initially said as much."
The Taliban, normally not ones to shy away from publicity wanted the kidnapping to fly below the radar.
If the ransom to be negotiated was money, the Times, even in its current straights, could cough up enough to purchase release.
But going back to the Taliban and Al Qaida's primary strategy of attacking American public opinion, what if the ransom was not cash but news coverage?
This is not to say that the Times yielded and shaped their coverage to the demands of the captors--I sincerely doubt they did. The Times may be many things, but from my contacts with its reporters, it is not the type to negotiate coverage with terrorists. Even they are smart enough to realize if you do it just once--you are gonna have to do it forever. Which is why you do not negotiate with terrorists.
But, I can definately see the Taliban wanting to put that option on the table. And if that option was on the table, broad public knowledge of a reporter for the Times being held hostage would make it more difficult to get the editorial ransom from the Times. A shift in tone of coverage coinciding with kidnapping would deminish the effectiveness of the Taliban's editorial demands.
In modern 4th Generation Warfare, the media is the target of many actions. If I was the Taliban, I would kidnap reporters and demand editorial ransom. Many things can be purchased with cash from opium or other criminal enterprises ran by terrorist organizations, but editorial coverage is too tempting not to ask for.
In the modern media battlespace we have already seen media outlets capitulate to threats of violence--the cartoons & Fitna come to mind. CNN traded access for self censoring editorial in Iraq under Saddam's regime. And of course there is Walter Duranty.
As the threat enviorment and 4GW grows, editors and publishers will have to steel themselves to the new environment. The public will have to be aware of how modern terrorists and insurgents target them through the media.
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Jun
17
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Wednesday, 17 June 2009 |
Max Boot's article in today's Wall Street Journal makes a point I have made on many occasions--the need to keep a cadre of Officers and NCOs in combat theatres for years.
Boot even uses an example I used a few months ago, the British Soldier/Diplomat Robert Warburton .
The British in the 19th century faced the same challenges we face. Indeed, the only thing that has changed in Afghanistan is the technology of the weaponry.
In my pre-deployment reading there is a recurring theme to these works, one summed up best by Robert Warburton:
"...to deal with Afghans, officers must be employed who have knowledge of their languages, customs and ways."
That quote comes from Warburton's memoir "Eighteen Years in the Khyber."
Let the title of the book sink in for a moment. Eighteen Years stationed in and around the Khyber pass.
In the Victorian era, British officers may have spent an entire career abroad, but with generous grants of leave.
According to Boot, General Stanley McChrystal is moving to develop a small cadre of AfPak experts who will work in the same provinces for years rather than one deployment or in a shorter deployment rotation where they always return to the same general area.
I saw the utility of this during my time with the Marines in Al Anbar province Iraq. The Marines of Vengeance Platoon deployed to Fallujah in 2005, 2006 and 2007.
By the Summer of 2007 Sgt. Stephen Schlau, who was a PFC in 2005 when he first deployed, was an old hand in the region. There was no learning curve. The seven months deployed, five months home rotation was tough, but highly effective.
The strategy of creating a cadre of Officers and NCOs who work the same villages and provinces for years is sound. It has worked before and will work again.
The only question is does the administration have the patience to create a modern generation of Warburtons who may spend 18 years in the Khyber?
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Jun
11
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Friday, 12 June 2009 |
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LTC Jim Crider has published a report on his experience as a battalion commander in 2007-08 in Baghdad.
I was with Crider's 1/4 Cav. in early May 2007.
When I was with them they were just begining to understand counter insurgency and from what I saw in the fall of 2009, Crider and the follow-on unit got it right.
Download the full report here . I'll be reading it on the plane tomorrow.
For a little visual flavor of what Crider is talking about, watch this.
For a more detailed look, my documentary Baghdad Surge shows the tactics, techniques and procedures in vivid color and sound following a Company Commander who operated a few blocks from Crider's 1/4 Cav.
Crider was thrown in a tough environment, adapted and succeeded. He took me for a tour down 60th street as my own personal PSD when it was just dogs and snipers. Crider was never afraid to get down on the street and do the work.
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Jun
03
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Wednesday, 03 June 2009 |
As noted in the WSJ editorial , the confirmation hearings for Lt. Gen. McChrystal were pretty much a non-event.
There were plenty of agitators wanting to pick a fight, but President Obama possess a set of unique abilities as Commander in Chief--namely that he is a left leaning, mostly anti-war Democrat.
But because he has taken ownership of the fight in Afghanistan many of the agitators are blunted.
Which is an ability I hope he continues to use.
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Jun
01
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Monday, 01 June 2009 |
Yard signs, posters and banners were every where in Kuwait in May 2005.
I was in transit limbo and had a few days to catch glimpses of the campaigns.
It is amazing how political signs look the same everywhere--how there is almost a regression to the mean in all political campaigns no matter what country they are in.
I was reminded of Kuwait's elections by this column in the WSJ .
After Islamist parties won elections, many thought it proved democracy promotion was a bad idea. Why promote democracy if the wrong parties get elected?
But the same waxing and waning of parties and ideologies we see in Western countries applies to Arab countries as well.
What is important is not who wins a particual election but that the machinery of elections and democracy itself which holds those who won accountable.
In selectorate theory of elections, a large voting pool and frequent elections forces a moderation as the ruling elite must maintain a large and diverse coalition.
Promotion of legitimate elections as a policy cannot be judged by one or two election cycles, but must be viewed over the long term.
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May
27
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Wednesday, 27 May 2009 |
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I am beginning to feel a bit like Captain Willard in the opening scenes of the movie Apocalypse Now.
No, I'm not getting stoned, doing shots and practicing kung fu in my underwear, but I am ready for the next mission. This one is to Afghanistan.
I just got my transit date for mid-July and am making all the logistical arrangements.
This trip is significantly more expensive than Iraq. It is almost double the cost of an Iraq expedition.
I finance these trips with DVD sales .
The important work is not so much the final filmed product but the on the ground reporting.
To fully finance this trip I need to sell another 143 DVDs this month and 250 in June.
The coming months will be a critical time in Afghanistan as General Petraeus and Lt. Gen. McChrystal begin implementing what could be the final push to wrest the Taliban from their strongholds.
It will be important to have as many eyes, ears and camera lenses on the ground as possible.
Another 393 DVDs sold will put me there.
You can also purchase them through Amazon.com .
This is not my first trip to the rodeo. I've covered the wars since 2005. I know the risks and accept them because the work is important.
The news is too important to be left solely to the MSM.
If you can afford to please purchase a DVD, or you can also make a contribution via paypal.
I will go wherever the story is and have no compunction against putting myself in harms way. I just would like a little help with the airfare.
JD
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May
22
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Friday, 22 May 2009 |
"Now you can take back our answer, which is that we consider that, if the case of becoming friends with the King, we shall be more valuable friends if we retain our arms than if we surrender them; and if it is a case of fighting, we shall fight better if we retain our arms."
That was response of the Greek General Clearchus to the amabassadors of the Persian King Ataraxerxes. And it will be similar to the response the Iranians give to President Obama.
In 401 B.C., a group fo 10,000 Greek mercenaries joined an ill-fated attempt by Cyrus the Younger to seize the throne of the Persian empire from Ataraxerxes. Cyrus was killed in battle and the Greeks were on their own, deep in Persian territory along the Tigris river.
One of the King's ambassador's made the Persian position clear:
"The Kind considers that, since he killed Cyrus, the victory is his. He thinks that you, too, are in his power, since he has got you in the middle of his territories, surrounded by impassable rivers, and can bring against you such masses of men that you could never kill them all."
The Persian King clearly felt he was operating from a position of strength in demanding the Greeks surrender their arms, but he was not understanding the absolute logic of the situation as the Greeks viewed it.
Two Greek officers made their responses.
Proxenus said, "[is] the King asking for our arms by right of conquest or as gifts to show our friendship. If it is by right of conquest, why should he have to ask us for them instead of coming to take them?"
But Theopompus made the logic clear to all:
"The only things of value which we have at present are our arms and our courage. So long as we keep our arms we fancy that we can make good use of our courage; but if we surrender our arms we shall lose our lives as well. So do not imagine that we are going to surrender to you our only valuables."
In the current era of negotiations with the Persians, who are now called Iran, they are employing the logic of the Greeks.
The potential of a nuclear weapon is their most valuable asset.
If the US truly wants to be friends with the Iranians and wishes them no ill will, why do we care if they have nukes? The US gets along fine with other nuclear powers.
And the US is such a dominant power, why don't they just come and take the weapons away?
The Greeks understood that King Ataraxerxes was not in a truly dominant position and were not certain if the King really wanted friendship.
The Greeks kept their arms and their journey out was chronicled by their eventual leader, Xenophon in the book 'The Persian Expedition.'
President Obama is, in some ways, in the position of Ataraxerxes and the Iranians know it.
In middle eastern culture, the person seeking to negotiate is seen as being in a position of weakness.
We in the west for some reason have adopted negotiation as the default political position and are ignoring the absolute logic of the situation.
The most valuable thing the Iranian regime possess is the threat of nuclear weapons. If they give it up and the US reneges on any promises, the Iranians have nothing.
Therefore the Iranians will respond like Clearchus.
"Now you can take back our answer, which is that we consider that, if the case of becoming friends with the King, we shall be more valuable friends if we retain our arms than if we surrender them; and if it is a case of fighting, we shall fight better if we retain our arms."
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May
21
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Thursday, 21 May 2009 |
In a previous post I mentioned how embeds can enhance operations in the media battlespace by providing fact from the ground.
Today's Wall Street Journal shows a classic scenario.
If an embed had been with the unit in question, a lot of the back-and-forth would have ended immediately.
But now we have Taliban sympathizers putting bodies on display and the military offering a 'report.'
The military report is likely 100% correct, but in the media battlespace imagery wins. Gunsight imagery may help, but is no substitute for images and reporting from a third party, on the ground as the events were happening.
It is only a matter of time before the Taliban starts 'arming' their cells and supporters with flip cameras to record images of 'civillian' casualties.
In the media battlespace a $100 camera can be the most effective weapon.
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