Nov
12
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Thursday, 12 November 2009 |
I have lifted weights more in the first
few weeks of this trip to Iraq than I ever have before.
The lower operational tempo is a contributing
factor. In the "old days" I would go outside the wire
for days or weeks at a time sleeping in the dirt and living off the
land or living in a Patrol Base or Combat Outpost that was just a rented
house with a pallate of bottled water stacked up in once corner and
boxes of MREs in another.
The other contributing factor is that
every Company sized installation now has a nice little gym.
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gym at JSS Sharquat in Northern Saladin province, Iraq |
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Because the equipment varies from place
to place (I'm on my 4th gym in 3 weeks) and there may not be a soldier
around to spot me, I try to stick with dumbbells. The only problem
is that on dumbbell incline press I need 100 pounders and most of the
smaller gyms only go up to 80 or 90 pounds.
But at least there is a gym!
In this end-stage operating enviorment
I work out in the morning, eat breakfast, read the Bible, figure out
what is going on that day, jump in an MRAP, bounce around in the back
of the MRAP, eat lunch with important local Iraqi, head back to the
base.
I keep a few low-carb protein bars in
my cargo pocket while on missions and a tub of whey protein at whatever
little base I'm living at.
The only other downside is the food.
At the big bases there is plenty of protein at the DFACs (chow halls.)
At a little place like Sharqat some meals
are mostly carbs.
The whey protein is a must.
I still log my workouts like I recommend
people do in my book. Overloading over time is important even
when in a combat zone.
My workout is a simple four day rotation.
Day 1--Lats, rear delts, traps
Day 2--Chest
Day 3--Biceps, Triceps
Day 4--Delts
The unpredictability of Iraq imposes
days off.
If I was at a larger FOB for a year,
I could do a serious cycle through the Phases of the System. But
with moving every week and eating 1 Iraqi meal a day, my goal is just
maintain.
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Nov
11
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Wednesday, 11 November 2009 |
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Sala ad Dihn Province, Iraq--
In the US many Americans barely notice
Veterans Day. The banks and post offices are closed. Federal
Employees have the day off. Some states and local governments
may be closed.
There are ceremonies and memorial services.
But here in Iraq it is another day at
work in a combat zone.
The Soldiers of the 1-28 Infantry, the
Black Lions, went about their work.
I went with a Platoon to the city council
meeting in Ishaki, a small town south of Samarra.
The Platoon Leader sat back during the
meeting and let the Iraqis do their work. After the meeting he
talked about the timeline of some development projects with the Council
President.
The meals were the normal rations heated
up by Army cooks. The big KBR Dining Facilities are for big bases,
not little outposts.
The kitchen at the JCC in Samarra is
of typical design.
If many of the Soldiers realized today
was Veterans day, they didn't show it.
I didn't really realize until I looked
at my pocket calendar.
For decades veterans were older men.
Now they are women and men in their early to mid twenties, many on their
second tour in a combat zone.
They were not drafted. They did
not join when the entire nation was mobilized for war.
They volunteered when the war in Iraq
was unpopular. They re-enlist knowing they will face a fight in
Afghanistan.
They are the ones willing to stand on
the wall that protects the modern culture--the plastic-disposable-drive-thru-strip-mall
culture of America from the people who want to burn it all down.
Too many of the people in the drive-thru
culture went about their day today without realizing what the young
men I was with today do for them.
It is a luxury they enjoy because Soldiers,
Sailors, Marines and even Airmen will leave the plastic world and enter
the real world.
JD relies on viewer support to keep reporting from the war zone. Please hit the tip jar or buy a dvd.
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Nov
09
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Monday, 09 November 2009 |
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I do not know what victory looks like in a counter insurgency. With
the recent bombing in Baghdad it is hard to say that a true victory and
a true peace has been achieved. There are still deadly attacks on US
troops.
The true success of the war in Iraq will be revealed in the coming months and years.
But what is for sure is that the fight is now being waged by the Iraqi police and, to a lesser degree, the Iraqi army.
After
full implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement on June 30th
2009, the US role in the remaining counter insurgency has dwindled.
The US Forces in Iraq are no longer waging an active war against
violent extremist networks, their role now is stability, economics,
governance and training.
The US Forces Iraq fill a gap between the central government of Iraq and local government.
Here in Saladin province north of Baghdad the 4th Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division is rapidly adapting to the new normal.
In
2007 during the troop surge the 4th Brigade was deployed to some of the
roughest parts of Baghdad like West Rashid, Ammel, Bayaa and Rustamya.
I was embedded with unis from the 4th Brigade in 2007 and filmed the
soldiers as they actively hunted down Jaish al Mahdi and Al Qaida cells
and shot it out with hidden gunmen. I went with them on grueling daily
patrols through the neighborhoods to conduct census and intelligence
gathering missions.
In 2007 the Iraqi Army and Police were in the
background and at best they were merely ineffective, at worst they were
aligned with the active enemy.
Now, in late 2009, the 4th is back in Iraq in the area around Tikrit with a whole new mission.
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Nov
03
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Tuesday, 03 November 2009 |
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This line from a Washington Post story jumped out at me:
"The arrival of war dead at Dover has long pitted free speech advocates against the government, which had been accused of using the ban to hide the horror of war from the public--especially as casualty rates in Iraq and Afghanistan began to climb."
The article is by Christian Davenport.
I'm at a little outpost in northern Iraq, fresh back from a patrol where we met with a local Sheik. The previous day I had rode with US Soldiers to a logistics base on a resupply run and while there picked up a few back issues of Stars and Stripes where I read the story.
In the story, a previous graph has a quote from University of Delaware Journalism Professor Ralph Begleiter one of the above mentioned free speech advocates. Begeleiter said, "Taking pictures of the returning casualties to Dover is a measure of the human cost of war. Do you want the government ultimately to have control over what we see or not see? Or do you want independent observers, an independent press or media, relaying those images?"
Mr. Begleiter if you really want to understand the human cost of war, don't stand on a fucking tarmac, get embedded and see the human cost of war up close and personal where the price is actually paid.
But many of the free speech advocates have no desire to put themselves at risk to tell the stories of the women and men who have willingly put themselves in harms way.
They want to do it on the cheap, standing on concrete in the US at a scheduled time rather than face the capricious hazards of war standing on the sands of Iraq or rocks of Afghanistan.
Many of those free speech advocates are interested only in the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines as props. As the story illustrates, very few of the arrivals at Dover are covered by the media.
When a reporter is embedded with US forces they at least have to share some of the risks and possibly themselves become another account in the human cost of war.
I have been ready to pay that price for the last five years and nearly had to pay it a few times. How many of the so-called speech advocates have been willing to pay that price?
JD relies on viewer support to keep reporting from the war zone. Please hit the tip jar or buy a dvd.
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Oct
19
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Monday, 19 October 2009 |
The drive east on the interstate 70 turnpike is pretty common for people in Eastern Kansas. Residents of Lawrence and Topeka who work in Kansas City drive into the sun in the morning and again at night.
I skirted around Kansas City proper, heading North on the 435 loop to Kansas City International Airport for a flight to Washington, DC.
Kansas City is a hub for federal agencies. The flights to DC are always filled with politicians, bureacrats, lobbyists and lawyers.
This Monday was no exception.
I parked my car in the garage. Kinda pricey at $18 dollars a day, but it wouldn't be there long. A friend of mine was flying home from Seattle in the evening and would drive my car home. It worked out good for both of us, especially since I will not need my car until December when I get home from working in Iraq.
Yeah, I have a long commute to the office.
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It wasn't the longest or worst layover ever. That prize goes to sleeping in Heathrow's International Arrival's Lounge one night.
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Oct
09
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Saturday, 10 October 2009 |
I'm headed back to Iraq in a fews days. Yes, there is still is a war being wrapped up there.
I'll be back with my old friends in the 4th BDE of the 1st ID and the 1-28 Infantry.
I spent a lot of time with the 1-28, the Black Lions, during the surge in 2007. The Black Lions are unit featured in my documentary 'Baghdad Surge.'
I'll be doing two months on this trip then probably heading to Afghanistan in January to go snow boarding.
As for the question...
A few people asked why I wrote a fitness/weightlifting book instead of a book about Iraq.
Short answer: Not sure I could add much that isn't already covered in the documentaries.
Long answer: People kept asking me what I do to stay in shape to run around with soldiers and Marines. People at the gym who noticed my transformation asked a lot of questions. Those answers in emails, etc. became long enough that my friend Nita Marquez said I should turn it into a book.
When I hit stopping points in editing the documentaries I would hammer out the book.
The next thing I knew I had 200+ pages that kind of made sense. Nita and I then really went to work on taking her expertise, my experiences and the knowledge of other people and turning it into an open architecture system anyone can use to dial in the workout and eating plan that will achieve their personal goals.
Oddly enough, there is a lot of Iraq in the book as my experiences there were the impetus for my getting really serious about working out.
Hence the subtitle of the book: When Fitness is a Matter of Life or Death .
I test how good my workout program is everytime I go to Iraq and Afghanistan. So, far it has proven to work well.
Until my next post from somewhere in Iraq....Non Timebo Mala
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Oct
07
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Wednesday, 07 October 2009 |
Governing by polls and popularity regularly leads to failure and indecision due to the nature of information provided by polls which reflects how humans caliberate choices.
In the US a campaign is mostly binary. The electorate can choose between Candidate A or Candidate B. They have only two things to compare thus the caliberation is easy.
But once in office and setting forth proposals and policies, there are multiple options. There are many potential ways to go forward in Afghanistan.
The electorate looks at the current situation, the proposal and the many other possibilities. Each individual also has their individual idealized solution for their personal situation. Thus consensus is hard to reach.
In approval ratings polls, it becomes even more clear. The office holder is no longer compared to a singular or potential pair of opponents, he is compared to the preferences of respondent. The office holder is not compared to Candidate B, but to a preferred version of what that office holder could or should be.
Very rarely do office office holders match enough of the electorate's preferences to have a wide approval rating for the long haul.
Candidates and staffers who are very good at campaigns are very good at winning the binary comparision battle.
But governing is not a binary comparison.
Passing legislation and governing is easiest when the office holder does not try to win a binary against the many potential ideals, but by winning against the worst case scenario.
With the public growing weary of the protracted wars and the well known challenges of Afghanistan, the best option is not arguing in favor of the best possible outcome in Afghanistan, but how to prevent the worst possible scenario.
It is impossible to achieve a meaningful plurality on the best possible outcome in Afghanistan, but it is possible to reach a majority on how to prevent the worst case scenario.
The worst case being the Taliban controlling all of Afghanistan and as in 1990s, allowing it to be safe haven for various international terrorist groups and groups seeking to topple the Pakistani Government.
We all can agree on what that led to in the past.
Then the work of building a large plurality becomes easier.
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Sep
08
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Tuesday, 08 September 2009 |
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UPDATE: Afghanistan's Electoral Complaint Commission has ordered an audit/recount in response to "Clear and convincing evidence of fraud."
In the lore of American elections, Cook county, Illinois looms large. Cook county, according the legends, if not in fact, always reported the returns of elections last--despite being in the City of Chicago. Rural backwaters and the suburbs would report the returns and then after every other vote was counted, Cook county would report returns giving the winning margin to whatever candidate the machine favored.
I have a concern that Afghanistan's version of Cook county is in the provinces of Farah, Nimroz, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Khost and Paktika.
What causes this concern of mine is not just that those areas are the last places to report returns or that they going to Karzai in a range of 70% to 83% but that Afghanistan's Independent Election Commission still has not released the total turn out number nationally or by province.
Take a look at this interactive map . (Update: most of this post uses Sunday/Monday's numbers. An update is added at the end)
If the number of total ballots cast is announced, it makes it much, much harder for counting fraud to be carried out. But as it stands now, ballots can be added after the fact to create the winning margin.
In Afghanistan the ballots are in printed in the form of a bound tablet similar to a legal pad. Individual ballots are tore off and handed to the voter.
After the polls close and the counting begins, the first step is to count the total number of ballots. This is done by counting those in the clear plastic tub and comparing that to the number of tablets used and ballot pages remaining.
The ballots are extremely large owing to the 40 Presidential candidates. Counting is done by hand. These two factors make the counting process slow and difficult. But, the total number of ballots cast should have been known within 48 hours. It should have been the first solid number reported by the polling stations and the IEC.
But more than two weeks later, it is not published.
If the number of ballots cast is published immediately, the fraud is limited to percentages and more easily detected. In other words, the candidate benefiting from the fraud would have to get increasingly higher percentages from the Cook county style provinces and even then, he still might not get enough.
Corrupt election officials could over report voting, but would be limited still to plausibility--no one would believe 100% turn out in Kandahar.
In the 2004 Presidential election there were 308,896 total valid votes in Kandahar province. Karzai got 91% of the vote in the province.
Without the hard tally of total votes, corrupt officials can keep adding the total number of votes in-line with plausible percentages, and deliver the winning margin.
The hard turn out numbers are ideal, but with the data the IEC has already published and little math, we can improve our chances of detecting brazen fraud.
The province with the most Cook county potential is Kandahar.
Currently Karzai is leading with 82.3% of the vote with 30.9% of the polling stations tallied in Kandahar.
There are 87 polling centers in Kandahar province that have reported in. By this listing 245 total polling centers and 1,545 polling stations were open on election day . The actual count is by polling stations. Some polling centers have up to 8 polling stations.
This listing shows 1,283 polling stations.
So far there are 78,833 valid votes cast, Karzai has 64,901 of them. (Sunday's numbers)
The average turnout so far is 906 votes per polling center or 213 votes per polling station. If this number goes up dramatically, it is evidence something unusual is happening.
That would lead to an estimated 221,970 valid votes in Kandahar province. Considering that turnout was reported to be almost non-existent in Kandahar province, even the 30% reduction from the turnout in the 2004 elections should raise eyebrows. If the final number greatly exceeds the prediced number of votes, it is evidence of the Cook county effect.
If Karzai holds steady at 82.3%, he will pick up another 104,000 votes in Kandahar.
Now, here is where the fraud detection math comes in. (This is also where I go out on a limb into a broad generalization instead of sitting around for a few days crunching all the numbers.)
Nationwide 4,295,326 valid votes have been cast.
74.2% of all polling stations have been tallied.
26,275 polling stations were open. 19,496 have been tallied.
So far, the average is 220 votes per polling station for a wild ass guess prediction of 5,780,500 total votes.
Karzai is on track to pick up 2,809,323. He needs 2,896,030 to win outright and avoid the runoff.
The best places for him to close the gap are Kandahar, Paktika and Khost provinces. If the number of votes cast starts greatly exceeding the current predictions in those provinces, then you have a good notion that the Cook county effect is in play.
There is also an indicator of some type of effect in play.
On August 25th, with 10% of the polling stations reporting, Karzai had 41.8% of the vote.
On August 27th, 17.2% of the polling stations had been tallied. Karzai was winning with 44.8%.
On August 28th , with 35% of stations reporting, Karzai had 46.3% and on September 3rd he was up to 47.3% with 60% of the polling stations tallied.
Karzai now has 48.6% with 74.2% of polling stations reporting. (Sunday's numbers)
The only public poll prior to the election showed Karzai getting 44% of the vote.
The statistical jumps are slowing, but by the time 35% of polling stations are reported, even if it is not truly random, it is large enough to make an accurate projection from.
A jump from 46.3% to 47.3 to 48.6% is highly unlikely.
If the total gets to 50.1% the explanation is most likely found in this New York Times report .
The Times cites western officials who say "only about 25,000 people actually voted there."
By the calculations above, the turnout will be reported at 221,970. The Times reports it could be more than 350,000, exceeding the turnout in the 2004 election, which would be some brazen fraud.
Kandahar is looking like it could be Afghanistan's Cook county.
UPDATE:
Right before I went to post this blog, the IEC updated their statistics. Karzai now leads with 54.1%.
Where did all those votes come from? Lets look at the recent numbers from Kandahar.
With 61% of the polling stations tallied, there are supposedly 208,045 valid votes cast.
By the reporting yesterday, there were 213 votes per polling station. Today that average is up to 263 votes per polling station. Or, more accurately for our puposes, the most recent 386 stations , accounting for 129,212 votes, reported and an average of 334 total votes.
The uptick is just as I predicted would be seen if there was brazen fraud of the Cook county style.
Kandahar is now on track to have a supposed turnout of between 337,429 and 375,091.
Yesterday my prediction was for 221,970.
The same trends are showing up in Paktika and Khost provinces.
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