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"Al Qaeda killed his whole family. Fighting Al Qaeda is his life," the 1st Sergeant told me of Iraqi Police Lieutenant Zyeed.
"Get the National Police out of here. I think this guy is willing to cooperate but won't talk in front of them," the Captain said.
These conversations took place one month and 35 miles apart and capture the state of the Iraqi Police.
(J.D.'s Note--Blogger Matt Sanchez is also in Fallujah, Iraq and posted this report about the IP. Please take a moment to read it as well.)
In Fallujah, the hot item is the Fallujah Police t-shirt. Currently running for $50 or barter with a set of ESS ballistic glasses.
No soldier in Baghdad would ever consider wearing IP gear.
Like everything in Iraq, the state of the IP all depends on where you are because no two areas are alike.
In Anbar the IP and PSF may be your strongest allies. In Baghdad they may be your worst enemies.
I spent two weeks with the Black Lions, the 1-28 Infantry out of Ft. Riley, KS.
The Black Lions operate in West Rasheed. An area south of the fabled route Irish and bordered on the west by Camp Victory, the U.S. mega base at Baghdad International Airport.
Jaish al Mahadi has been waging a campaign of intimidation, terror and murder against the Sunnis in the area. JAM is winning.
The Police, dominated by the Shia, can't seem to ever catch those JAM guys. The IHP--whose compound I lived on for a week--seemed to only have one job, guarding their own compound and opening the gate for the Army platoons moving in and out.
The one time the IHP sprung into action was when a bomb was thrown into the back of an IHP pick-up truck. They started shooting in a 180-degree arc.
Later that afternoon another Shia dominated unit rolled in, gunned down a Sunni man on the street and took several Sunnis hostage.
The one who got gunned down was not an innocent good guy, but not a targeted AQIZ/Sunni Assassin type.
That was about all the effort I saw out of the IP in Baghdad.
The Baghdad Security plan is being undermined intentionally by the IP.
The plan is simple--deny freedom of movement to JAM and AQIZ murders. Which means the IP will have to man check points at neighborhoods and only let the residents of that neighborhood in. Not too difficult.
But the check points I saw manned by the IP resembled defensive fighting positions, only to be used when fired upon.
I saw no ID's being checked. No cars being searched.
It is like the only IPs in Baghdad who will work are the ones who are straight up JAM members who plant EFPs and murder Sunni on the side.
In Khalidiyah and Kharmah, where I was around IP and PSF members the sitution is the exact opposite.
The PSF members and their police supervisors actively man check points. If you try to come into an area you do not belong in you will be turned away or detained.
They even want to expand their territory in Kharma--to a very dangerous place. They know they may lose some men, but also know that it is necessary.
There are IP officers in Anbar who have prices on their head from AQIZ. Their family is all gone or in hiding in a foreign country. They live the fight 24/7.
In the past in the Fallujah area IP were pathetic. The old cliche of the IP working with the Marine by day but planting IEDs by night was true. But that cliche seems to no longer apply.
AQIZ overplayed their hand. The hard-core insurgents overplayed their hand. And once a few stood up, others began to follow. Now the IP and PSF, especially the tribal, village based PSF are the most effective force against AQIZ.
The IP and PSF are not a Western style police department. Their style is more Old West.
I suspect that is about as Western as it will get.
In Khalidiyah and Kharmah I did not fear the IP treachery. Actions are coordinated--to the degree that OpSec allows. At one point I thought I might have been left behind in Shihabi. I wasn't worried. I would just walk up to the fighting position on the hill and ask for a ride back to the Army outpost in the morning. They would have put me up for the night and drove me into town the next morning.
That or they would have sold me that piece of land of been eyeing, married me off to a local beauty and had me working my 4-hour-shift at the fighting position. I am pretty good with an AK after all.
In Baghdad, if I had to rely on an IP unit for my personal safety I would be grabbing a Glock out of a holster and running for my life.
In Baghdad the distrust is evident. In joint briefings between Army and Police units, the Army held back intelligence as did the Police.
It was almost like they were putting on a show for each other. No real information was shared.
The Black Lions have arrested IP for planting IEDs. But somehow none of the IP knew or even suspected there were JAM members in the IP.
I fear the IP, National Police and even some IA units are under the influence of a greater power.
I fear Maliki's government is also under the influence of a greater power.
One of the things Army officers in Baghdad were always working on was finding out who was actually pulling the strings and why.
I think the opening of a dialog with certain insurgent groups, especially among the Shia, is to determine who, if anyone, is actually in charge.
To find out who can turn off the madness.
It will probably turn out that the people who can turn off the madness have no intent of turning it off, and until those under their influence and sway awaken Anbar style, the murders and terror will continue, supported by the IP, NP, IA and Maliki regime.
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