May
20
2009
|
A Strategy Only President Obama Can Deploy |
|
|
|
Written by JD Johannes
|
|
Wednesday, 20 May 2009 |
The Taliban cannot dislodge US or NATO forces from any outpost or valley. They can make movement in the country dangerous, but not halt it.
The Taliban's best hope for victory--the US leaving Afghanistan--is not on ground, but in the media battlespace.
President Obama is perhaps the first war-time Commander in Chief able to engage in the media battlespace since World War II.
In modern guerrilla/insurgent warfare against an industrial Western opponent, the goal of the insurgent is not to follow the traditional three phases as espoused by Mao, Che and Ho and defeat the Western power on the field of battle.
The goal is to get the Western opponent to leave.
Retired Marine Colonel T.X. Hammes makes the case in his book 'The Sling and the Stone' that the goal of the modern insurgent is to influence the voters and politicians of the Western country. The goal being to sway public opinion to the point that the voters feel the war cannot be won or, even if it could be won, is not worth it.
The modern insurgent understands that the public views the war through the prism of the news media and therefore establishes his strategy around earning maximum Gross Rating Points showing chaos, mayhem and that the war cannot be won or even if it could, is not worth the cost.
The key measurements for the insurgent can be found in a January 2009 poll by the Pew Center for People and the Press.
Q49 Do you think the U.S. made the right decision or the wrong decision in using military force in Afghanistan?
Jan09 Feb08 Dec06 Jan06
Right 64 65 61 69
Wrong 25 24 29 20
Q50 How well is the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan going?
Jan09 Feb08
Very well 7 10
Fairly well 38 38
Not too well 34 31
Not at all well 11 10
Q51 Over the next year, do you think the number of troops in Afghanistan should be increased, decreased, or kept the same as it is now?
Increased 33
Decreased 39
Kept same 20
Q53 Regardless of what you think about the original decision to use military force in Afghanistan, do you now believe that the United States will definitely succeed, probably succeed, probably fail, or definitely fail in achieving its goals in Afghanistan?
Definitely succeed 13
Probably succeed 49
Probably fail 23
Definitely fail 6
Right now, those numbers are not very good for the Taliban. But at one time, the war in Iraq had similar numbers.
The goal of the insurgent is to sway Western and US voters from the "succeed" to "fail" columns and break the tie on "well" vs. "not so well."
They will do this through the news media.
On two occasions I tabulated the Gross Rating Points on the Iraq war, the most recent was in 2007 .
From June 2006 to June 2007, there were 12,624 pessimistic ratings points and 6,798 optimistic ratings points about the Iraq war.
Even after the success of the Surge was becoming obvious in late 2007, it took until September 2008 for enough points to be earned for the voters to catch up with the reality on the ground.
The Taliban's only hope is to leverage media to their advantage and earn more pessimistic ratings points. They will do this through spectacular attacks that may or may not have any tactical effect on the ground. A dismal failure of an assault on a US or NATO installation still generates the Taliban's preferred headlines.
To the Taliban, the desired strategic effect is through the media battlespace--not on the ground.
President Obama's relationship with the media will allow him to do what his predecessor could not--engage in the media battlespace.
Many would think that the best way to stave off pessimistic ratings points would be to lock the media out of Afghanistan. But, all that does is make the Taliban the primary content generator as they will record and distribute video of their attacks.
The media battlespace would then become a competition between the Taliban's graphic video and a military spokesman at a podium. The graphic video will win every time.
The first step for the Obama administration would be a policy of maximum embedding, preferrably long-term embeds where a reporter lives with one unit not just for days, but for weeks. This is current doctrine, spelled out the Counter Insurgency Manual FM 3-24 written by General David Petraeus, but is rarely put into action.
The more third party eyes and ears on the ground, the less the impact of the Taliban's spectacular attacks on the media battlespace.
The goal is maximum gross ratings points therefore diluting the content generated by the Taliban.
The second step is out reach to small and medium sized media outlets.
At any given time there are dozens of Reserve and National Guard units in Afghanistan, but covering them is complicated and expensive for smaller market newspapers and TV and Radio stations.
To reduce the cost, the DoD could move the embark point from Kuwait or Qatar to a stateside installation, provide body armor and rapid embedding to the Guard and Reserve units to be covered. (The embark point for all US based media could be moved stateside as well.)
The medium and small market outlets should also be given better access to the DIVIDS system to allow for exclusive, real-time reports to be transmitted back to the home market.
Slots for each media market could be awarded by lottery or Nielson ratings or bid--whoever guarantees the most ratings points gets first dibs.
In that same line of thought, rules for long-form or documentary productions could be relaxed allowing more production on speculation and festival circuit directors to embed without backing from a studio.
Media outlets should also be allowed more flexibility to "cross deck" moving from embedded to traveling with private security or a local fixer. This would reduce the cost of maintaining a secure facility as a bureau. The media sets up bureau offices in the White House, Pentagon and most State Capitols. Media organizations should be allowed to build a shack or rent a container to house their bureau on major bases like Victory Baghdad or Bagram.
The current media embed system is major leap forward from the micro-management of Desert Storm, but I do not think it has ever been reviewed in terms of how it can be re-tooled to maximize access and rating points.
The third step is the one that could only be instituted under President Obama, and that is to recognize that modern wars are also fought in the media battlespace and that the DoD needs to aggressively fight in that battlespace.
This is not an endorsement of government generated propaganda, but a policy that the DoD will actively engage the enemy in the media battlespace.
In the past the media howled when the idea was even broached, but President Obama's relationship with the media will allow him to show the neccessity of this policy.
If anyone thinks the DoD or Administration is generating propaganda, they can take a trip to the combat theaters. Some will say that they just get drive by tours of Potemkin Villages, but it is impossible to sustain a fraud for months or weeks with embeds in every Brigade or Regimental Combat Team.
The DoD will need to engage the media battlespace in theatre as well. This means newspapers, magazines, web, radio, TV, DVDs, satellite and even entertainment television. Yes, many often forget that the ratings points from entertainment programming are just as powerful as points in the news media.
In 2006 the media howled at the Coalition's efforts to take an the media battlespace through paid editorials in Iraqi newspapers. But just as Clauswitz described war a politics through other means, operations in the media battlespace is warfare through other means. President Obama's relationship with the Western 4th Estate could blunt criticism of effective tactics and strategies that will win the battlespace.
The Iraq war was nearly lost in the media battlespace. The Taliban will refine their strategy and wage the battle of ratings points smarter and harder in the coming year.
If President Obama is serious about winning in Afghanistan, and I believe he is, then he must not only fight the battle on the ground but employ his strongest assets and engage the Taliban in the media battlespace.
|
|
