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Sixteen kilometers up the Alishang river valley from Mehtar Lam is the village of Watangatu.
Like all the villages in the Alishang valley, Watangatu is a farming village where the local Ghilzai Pashtuns grow corn and rice in the fertile fields irrigated from the rapid flowing river.
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| Rice paddies irrigated by the Alishang river. Taken from the side door of a Blackhawk helicopter |
But Watangatu has a distinction that sets it apart from its neighbors in the valley, it is a common ambush site which is why I was there along with the Governor of Lagham province, the Chief of Police and the Commander of the local Afghan National Army Battalion.
One could call it a Shura or a Jirga, but Americans would understand it as a town hall meeting.
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| Pashtun men from Watangatu react to a quip the Governor of Lagham province |
The Afghan government with the support of USAID and the local military Provisional Reconstruction Team is building a paved road up the valley, but the sniping and violence is slowing construction.
Rather than go in with a heavy hand and use an infantry battalion like a sledge hammer to try and swat a few flys, the US Army Battalion in charge of Lagham province and the PRT decided to use the traditional Afghan approach--a Shura.
The Governor, Chief of Police and Afghan Army commander flew into
Watangatu on a CH-47 helicopter--the dual rotar helicopter commonly
referred as the Chinook.
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| Politicians riding in in a CH-47 |
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| The Alishang river as seen from the back of a CH-47 |
The villagers congregated at the school house, filling the long hallway
in both directions. All the attendees were men. The male children sat
outside listening.
As is common in rural Afghanistan where the Burka has been common for centuries--there were no women in sight.
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| A packed school house |
Nearly two hundred men, nearly all with faces that are the map of
Pashtunistan, sat shoulder to shoulder as the politicians spoke.
The old men looked as as old as the valley itself. Take away the few vehicles and you would not know what century you were in.
Some of the old men may have never ventured beyond Mehtar Lam or
Jalalabad. The whole lives of generations being lived almost entirely
in the valley.
The families of the Alishang valley were there when Alexander passed
through, they have been invaded by Mongols, Turks, Persians, British
and Russians.
The United States is the just the most recent foreign army. We will leave, but the families of the Alishang will remain.
In all my travels, Afghanistan I think Afghanistan is the most foreign
of places. The upper Alishang valley, being almost complete untouched
by modernity.
In my travels I have learned one universal truth--politicians sound the same in every language and are all equally long winded.
The need to cooperate with the Americans and that the Americans are
guests in Afghanistan was a recurring theme of the politicians.
The repeated references to the Americans as guests is powerful. Under
the Pashtunwali, the honor code of the Afghan hill tribes, guests are
to protected and cared for. Any harm that would come to a guest while
under the protection of a tribe would be a mark of shame for that
tribe.
Another theme repeated by the Afghan politicans and leaders was that
the US were not the Russians, there was no need for Jihad. This Afghan
government is legitimate.
In a country that has been invaded by every empire but the Roman, it is a hard sell.
Air Force LTC Ben Ungerman, the commander of the PRT in Lagham, echoed those words in his brief speech before the Shura.
"We are not the Russians," Ungerman said.
He opened his speech with a phrase in Arabic phrase meaning "these
words are inspired by God." Then switched to Pashto saying his goal
was "prosperity and building in Alishang."
Toward the end of the meeting, the real business of the Shura began to happen, the negotiation and airing of grievances.
A delegation from one village accuses the other of harboring, "men from Peshawar" which is code for Taliban.
The accused then stands up and says that if there are "men from Peshawar" in his village, he will kill them himself!
And it goes on and on.
One of the grievances that needs to be settled is a blood fued between
two families that has led to 20 murders over the past 5 years.
Another village accuses its neighbor downstream of charging a toll to
pass the road and of holding people and preventing them from driving to
Mehtar Lam. The Chief of Police and Afghan Army Commander jump to
their feet and declare that they will find the brigands and bring them
to justice.
More grievances are aired and the the old Maliks and Governor pledge to resolve the problems.
This is the traditional Afghan way.
In the Pashtunwali, the code of honor for the Afghan hill people, a harm done must be repaid--eye for eye.
But compensation in the form of cash, sheep, grain or anything else of value can also be worked out.
The delicate trick for the Maliks, the village elders, and civil
authorities is to reach a settlement that compensates the victim and
leaves the dignity of the offender in tact.
The Pashtun are a very proud people and any offense is cause for a
fued. Often the offender in settling the debt does not acknowledge
error, but chooses to "settle" the matter so that he can quit wasting
his time with it or settles only out of respect for the elder's wishes,
thus allowing him to maintain an air of being in the right.
The medium-grade violence around Watangatu that is slowing construction of the road is the work of a handful of trouble makers.
Everyone knows who they are, or has a good idea of who they are, the
goal of the Shura is to encourage the local families and villages to
police their own.
The Commanding Officer of Task Force Wild Horse LTC John S. Cunningham
told me the violence in the Alishang river can be broken down into
three categories: Taliban Cadre/Anti-Afghan Forces, local residents
who attack Coalition Forces solely for pay, and fueds that spill over
into attacks on Afghan forces.
"The first group, you almost just have to kill," Cunningham said. "The
other two, we try convince them to change their ways, give them a
better job or an alternative to taking shots at us."
Cunningham, despite being the senior US military authority did not
speak before the crowd. He sat back watched and listened. His
rationale for this was that Afghan civil government and local leaders
need to take the lead, with the PRT, the source of jobs and contracts,
being the US face.
"They think everyone in uniform is PRT," Cunningham said. A notion he
seemed in no hurry to correct as people are less likely to take shots
at a source of commerce, roads and jobs.
The shura closed the way it began, with a prayer.
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| Official closing of the Watangatu Shura |
After the Shura, the delegation flew back to Mehtar Lam in Blackhawks and had a quick lunch with the Governor Lutfallah Mashal.
Mashal is not a native of Lagham province, he is actually from Patika
province. The province Governors are not elected, the are appointed by
the President.
Governor Mashal says being from another province can be an advantage as
he come without ties to one clan or family in the province.
His goal at the Shura was to goad the family leaders, the Maliks, into taking charge of the rabble in the valley.
He said they can police their own if they want to and in some parts of Lagham, they have.
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| JD and Governor Lutfallah Mashal. |
After the lunch LTC Ungerman and members of the PRT reviewed with their interpreters notes on the Shura.
Ungerman, like many officers, has been thrust into the role of military
governor. It is not a role many officers are trained for, but one he
embraces.
He says it easy for PRT Commanders to make mistakes and the biggest ones is wielding too much power.
Ungerman says he has to be humble and lift up the Afghan government, to
give them the credit and let the Afghans make the decisions--things
that are difficult for many high ranking US officers who are used to
taking charge, making decisions and getting things done.
But a victory over an insurgency is won by gaining the passive support
of the population by doing things the insurgents cannot and showing
that the civil government is in control and responsive to the people.
The Taliban does not build roads, dig wells or improve irrigation. The
Taliban does not increase commerce or provide education.
"They want roads," LTC Cunningham told me after the Shura. "Roads mean
commerce, commerce means a better life. You don't have to negotiate
roads with them. They want them."
And Cunningham and Ungerman point out that the Taliban and Anti-Afghan Forces do not want roads.
The further the roads push up the river valleys, the less influence the Taliban has.
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| The Alishang river and surround farm land and villages. |
As we waited for our Blackhawk to take us back to Mehtar Lam, one officer told me that he can feel the clock ticking.
"We only have a year, maybe a little more, to start making serious progress," he said.
The Taliban knows this too.
In 2007, when the clock was ticking in Iraq, many tribal leaders and Iraqi politicians stepped up to the challenge.
The question I have in my mind is if the Afghans can hear the clock ticking and if they even care.
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